

Strategies for fostering national defense awareness in Indonesia: analysis of the 2022–2024 National Defense Index

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Abstract

Strategic geopolitical shifts, digital disruption, and the rise of non-military threats require Indonesia's national defense policy to move beyond normative and ceremonial approaches toward adaptive and measurable governance. This study analyzes the effectiveness of the National Defense Awareness Development Policy (PKBN) by examining regulatory coherence, cross-sectoral governance, and the role of the National Defense Index (IBN) as an evaluation instrument. Using a convergent mixed-methods design, this research integrates qualitative regulatory analysis with quantitative comparative analysis of IBN data from 2022 and 2024. The findings indicate that although PKBN has a relatively comprehensive legal foundation, its implementation remains administratively oriented and weakly integrated across actors. The national IBN score shows relative stability with a marginal increase, reaching 3.50 in 2024, yet significant disparities persist across regions and dimensions, particularly in Love for the Homeland (CTA) and Initial Defense Capability (KAB), with weaker performance observed in Papua and Southeast Sulawesi. These results demonstrate that IBN can function not only as an aggregate measurement tool but as a policy compass linking inputs, processes, and outcomes when supported by structured performance indicators and feedback mechanisms. Strengthening network-based governance, digitized evaluation systems, and differentiated regional interventions is therefore essential to transform PKBN into a measurable and adaptive instrument of national resilience toward Indonesia Emas 2045.

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Introduction

The changing global security landscape over the past two decades has seen a significant shift from the dominance of conventional military threats to complex, asymmetrical, and multidimensional non-military threats. Globalization, digitalization, technological disruption, ideological polarization, and the intensification of information warfare have broadened the spectrum of threats to state sovereignty and resilience, not only in the physical realm but also in the social, ideological, economic, and cultural dimensions. In this context, national resilience can no longer be understood solely as the military capability of a country, but rather as the result of the interaction between the capacity of

the state and the awareness and active participation of citizens in maintaining the existence and sustainability of the state (Nye, 2019; Lerner, 2021). National defense awareness thus becomes a strategic foundation in a modern defense system that places citizens as both subjects and objects of defense. In Indonesia, the normative concept of national defense adheres to a universal defense system that involves all national resources, including human resources, natural resources, and artificial resources. Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for National Defense and Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021 emphasize that fostering national defense awareness is an integral part of non-military defense policy. This policy positions national defense not only as a constitutional obligation, but also as a process of internalizing national values, loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and preparedness to face non-physical threats such as radicalism, disinformation, social fragmentation, and degradation of national identity. In the context of Indonesia's demographics, which are dominated by the younger generation and intensively exposed to the global digital space, the urgency of fostering national defense awareness has grown stronger as a strategic instrument of national defense. Although the normative framework for the policy on fostering national defense awareness (PKBN) has been established, its implementation faces serious challenges at the operational and evaluative levels. Various policy reports and academic studies show that the implementation of PKBN still faces problems of institutional fragmentation, overlapping authorities, variations in program quality between regions, and limitations in comprehensive data-based evaluation mechanisms (Jansen, 2008; Siswanto, 2017). In addition, the dynamic nature of non-military threats means that the level of public awareness of national defense is not static, but fluctuates in line with social, political, and cultural changes. This situation raises fundamental questions about the extent to which existing PKBN policies are able to adapt to the dynamics of the strategic environment and influence public awareness in a sustainable manner.

A number of previous studies have examined national defense from various perspectives. The study by Rusyadi, A.R., and Nurida (2022) highlights the role of national defense awareness in preventing radicalism and terrorism, emphasizing the importance of educational and cultural approaches. Siswanto (2017) expands the concept of national defense to the economic realm by placing national economic security as part of a non-military defense strategy. On the other hand, Wajdi (2022) and Jubei et al. (2021) introduce the concept of reversibility of national defense awareness, which asserts that the level of public awareness can increase and decrease in line with changes in the social and political context. These studies provide important conceptual contributions, but they are generally still partial and have not been integrated into a comprehensive policy analysis framework.

At the public policy level, research on the implementation of non-military defense policies in Indonesia is still dominated by normative and descriptive regulatory approaches. These approaches tend to emphasize the compliance of policies with the legal framework, but lack elaboration on the effectiveness of cross-sectoral implementation and mechanisms for inter-agency synergy (Kurhayadi, 2023). Meanwhile, international literature on soft power asserts that shaping public awareness and loyalty is more effectively achieved through persuasive, value- and culture-based strategies than through coercive approaches (Nye, 2004; Winkler & Nye, 2005). However, the integration of the concept of soft power into the analysis of national defense policy in Indonesia is still relatively limited and has not been empirically tested using measurable indicators.

The main research gap that can be identified is the absence of a study that systematically integrates public policy analysis, the concept of soft power, institutional synergy, and the dynamics of national defense awareness based on national empirical data. In particular, the use of the National Defense Index (IBN) as a policy evaluation instrument is still rarely used to analyze the effectiveness of PKBN implementation across time and regions. In fact, the 2022 and 2024 IBN data provide

significant analytical opportunities to examine fluctuations in national defense awareness, identify critical variables such as love for the homeland and national and state awareness, and assess the consistency of government policies in the medium term.

Based on these research gaps, the novelty of this study lies in the integration of four theoretical frameworks—public policy theory, the soft power model, institutional synergy theory, and the theory of reversibility of awareness—into a single descriptive analysis framework based on IBN data. This study not only captures the achievements of PKBN policy normatively, but also evaluates the effectiveness of its implementation through measurable empirical indicators. In addition, this study offers a roadmap for long-term national defense awareness policy that emphasizes the importance of cross-sectoral synergy and policy adaptability to social dynamics. The scientific contribution of this research is expected to enrich the literature on non-military defense by providing a data-driven and multidisciplinary model for analyzing national defense policy. From a practical perspective, the findings of this study can be used as a reference for policymakers in developing more integrated, adaptive, and sustainable PKBN strategies, especially in facing non-military threats in the VUCA era. Thus, this study is not only academically relevant but also strategic in the context of national defense policy formulation. In line with these objectives, this study aims to analyze government policies in the implementation of national defense awareness programs, evaluate program achievements based on the 2022 and 2024 National Defense Index data, and formulate a model for inter-agency synergy and a roadmap for long-term national defense awareness policy that is data-driven and contextual.

Despite the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework, empirical evaluation of PKBN effectiveness remains limited. Previous studies have not systematically integrated public policy analysis, soft power theory, institutional synergy, and national empirical data within a unified evaluative framework. In particular, the National Defense Index (IBN) has rarely been positioned as an operational instrument for assessing policy outcomes across time and regions. This study therefore addresses three main questions: (1) to what extent is the PKBN regulatory framework coherent and aligned with a soft power-based governance approach; (2) how effective is PKBN implementation when evaluated using 2022–2024 IBN data; and (3) how can inter-agency synergy and evaluation mechanisms be strengthened to improve measurable policy outcomes? By integrating regulatory analysis and empirical index data, this research offers a more outcome-oriented perspective on non-military defense governance.

Methods

This study uses a mixed-methods approach with a convergent design, which integrates descriptive qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis based on secondary data. This approach was chosen because the policy of fostering national defense awareness (PKBN) has a dual character, namely as a normative-regulatory construction and as a public policy that produces an empirical impact at the community level. The integration of the two approaches allows researchers to assess policy consistency, implementation quality, and outcomes simultaneously and evidence-based.

The object of the research is the policy of fostering awareness of Indonesian state defense in the framework of non-military defense. The analysis unit includes national regulations on national defense, cross-sectoral implementation mechanisms, and community defense awareness achievements represented through the State Defense Index (IBN). The research focuses on the Indonesian national context with a time span of 2022–2024, in line with the enactment of PKBN technical regulations and the availability of IBN data that allows for comparative analysis between years.

The research population in the quantitative component includes all IBN survey respondents in 2022 and 2024 as compiled in the official report. This study uses a secondary data

census approach, by analyzing the entire available dataset without additional sample draws, to maintain the validity of national and regional comparisons. In the qualitative component, the document population consists of the main regulations that regulate state defense, with the purposive sampling technique of documents, namely the selection of regulations that have direct and operational relevance to the design and implementation of PKBN.

The data used is entirely in the form of secondary data. Qualitative data was obtained from documentation studies on Law Number 3 of 2002, Law Number 23 of 2019, Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021, and Regulation of the Minister of Defense Number 8 and 9 of 2022. Quantitative data is sourced from the 2022 and 2024 State Defense Index Report documents which contain national, regional, and national defense awareness scores. Data collection is carried out through tracing of official government sources and verifiable policy documents.

Qualitative research instruments are in the form of content analysis matrices, which are used to identify policy objectives, implementing structures, coordination mechanisms, and patterns of stakeholder involvement. The analysis is carried out by grouping the substance of the policy into normative, instrumental, and implementive domains. In the quantitative component, the instrument refers to the standard instrument of the IBN survey that has gone through a validation and reliability process by its compiler, with a composite index measurement scale on the dimension of state defense awareness.

Data analysis techniques are carried out sequentially and integrated. Qualitative analysis uses thematic content analysis to identify patterns of policy consistency and implementation gaps. Quantitative analysis was carried out through descriptive-comparative analysis, including comparison of IBN scores between years and between regions, as well as interpretation of dominant variables based on the results of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) listed in the official IBN report.

The policy analysis framework refers to the policy cycle framework, which includes the stage of identifying policy issues, evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory implementation, and formulating strategic policy recommendations. The entire analysis process is placed in the perspective of evidence-based policy analysis, so that the recommendations produced are contextual, measurable, and results-based.

The research procedure is carried out chronologically, starting from the formulation of research focuses and questions, the collection and selection of policy documents, the analysis of IBN data, the integration of qualitative and quantitative findings through triangulation of methods, to the preparation of policy synthesis and recommendations. In terms of research ethics, all data used is aggregate and does not contain personal identity, so that it meets the principles of anonymity, academic accountability, and research repeatability.

To enhance methodological transparency, comparative quantitative analysis was conducted by calculating changes in aggregate national IBN scores between 2022 and 2024 (Δ IBN), followed by dimensional comparison (CTA, KBB, RBB, and KAB) and interregional analysis to identify disparities. Because the measurement instrument remained consistent across both survey years, macro-level longitudinal comparison was considered valid. The interpretation of dominant variables refers to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) results reported in the official IBN documentation. This procedure ensures that policy evaluation is grounded in measurable empirical trends rather than normative assumptions.

Result and Discussion

Strategic Regulatory Framework

Content analysis was used in this study to systematically analyze key policy documents that form the legal and operational foundation of the State Defense Awareness Program (PKBN).

The main focus of this analysis was to identify the alignment between the normative vision, implementing instruments, and the reality of implementation in the field.

a. Documents Analyzed

Table 1. Analysis of 6 policy documents

Document	Substance
Law No. 3 of 2002	The basic principles of national defense and the obligation to defend the country as the right of every citizen.
Law No. 23 of 2019	Management of national resources for defense, including the formation of main components, reserves, and support.
Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021	Technical implementation of national resource management for defense, including PKBN in the fields of education, society, and employment.
Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022	Establishment of the Master Plan & RANBN as a national framework.
Minister of Defense Regulation No. 8 of 2022	Guidelines for the implementation of PKBN across sectors and the preparation of guidance materials based on the values of national defense
Minister of Defense Regulation No. 9 of 2022	Establishment of a structure for national defense cadres and facilitators, as well as mechanisms for selection, training, and evaluation

a. Fokus Analisis Konten

Table 2. Aspects of analysis

Aspects	Description
Strategic Vision	Is there a long-term policy direction that makes national defense a national soft power strategy?
Implementing Structure	To what extent does the policy include the division of roles between institutions (Ministry of Defense, TNI, local government, civil society)?
Stakeholder Engagement Scheme	Is there a multi-actor engagement mechanism in the implementation of PKBN? Who is involved, and how is their involvement regulated?
Continuity & Evaluation	Does the regulation include an evaluation, monitoring, and follow-up mechanism for program sustainability?

Strategic Vision

There is a long-term policy direction that makes national defense a national soft power strategy, but it has not been fully integrated. The meaning of national defense policy in Indonesia has expanded from a mere military obligation to part of efforts to strengthen national resilience based on citizen participation. This is reflected in various strategic policies formulated over the past decade, especially after the issuance of Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources for National Defense and Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022 concerning PKBN Policy. These documents indicate a long-term policy direction that makes national defense not only an individual obligation but also an instrument for building collective awareness and social cohesion in the face of non-military threats. By regulating the implementation of PKBN in three sectors—education, society, and the world of work—this policy implicitly forms the foundation of soft power through the internalization of values, behavioral change, and the dissemination of national norms in the civil sphere. However, when examined using Joseph Nye's soft power framework, which emphasizes the power of cultural appeal, ideology, and moral values rather than coercion, the direction of the national defense policy is still fragmentary and not yet fully operational as a soft power strategy. Here are some supporting reasons:

Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022 provides a clear strategic basis for fostering national defense awareness through the mandate of the 2020–2044 PKBN Master Plan as a long-term framework. This document emphasizes the integration of national values into formal education, community development, and the world of work as instruments for shaping collective awareness.

The values of national defense—such as love for the homeland, awareness of nationhood and statehood, and willingness to sacrifice—serve as symbols of nationality which, if consistently mainstreamed, can shape civil loyalty based on appeal. In this context, national defense has the strategic potential to be developed as an instrument of national soft power that fosters social cohesion without relying on coercive approaches.

The implementation of national defense policies still faces conceptual and operational challenges. Existing policy narratives have not explicitly positioned national defense as part of a cultural diplomacy or social influence strategy, but are still dominated by a framework of constitutional obligations, discipline, and formal training. The implementation of PKBN tends to be top-down and ceremonial, with limited use of digital media, cultural campaigns, and horizontal value dissemination mechanisms. In addition, there has been no adequate integration between the defense of the country program and foreign policy instruments, such as public diplomacy or international youth exchange programs, which could actually expand the resonance of the value of defending the country at the global level.

There is a strategic opportunity to transform PKBN into a more adaptive and data-driven soft power paradigm. The State Defense Index (IBN) can be used not only as a tool to measure public awareness, but also as a basis for designing public communication strategies and strengthening contextual social influence. The soft power approach has the potential to increase the legitimacy of the state in facing the challenges of disinformation, radicalization, and social fragmentation without promoting a militaristic approach. By optimizing the role of communities, local figures, and digital networks, PKBN can develop into a participatory and inclusive cultural movement, so that national defense not only functions as a mechanism for protecting physical sovereignty, but also as a source of symbolic strength and national identity amid disruptive global dynamics.

Implementing Structure

There is already a division of roles between institutions (Ministry of Defense, TNI, local government, civil society), but it is still predominantly sectoral and bureaucratic in nature, and does not yet fully mainstream the role of civil society in a systematic manner.

Based on content analysis of key regulations (Law No. 3/2002, Law No. 23/2019, Government Regulation No. 3/2021, Ministry of Defense Regulations No. 8 and 9 of 2022, and Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022), the implementing structure of PKBN is divided into the following levels and institutions:

Table 3. PKBN implementation structure

Level	Key Actors	PKBN-Related Functions
National	Ministry of Defense	Primary regulator, developer of the Master Plan and RANBN, responsible for coordination
	Ministries/Institutions (Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Manpower, Ministry of Home Affairs, etc.)	Implementing PKBN within their respective sectors
	Indonesian National Armed Forces (through the Education and Training Center)	Providing instructors and strengthening national character
Regional	Provincial & Regency/City Governments	Implementing local PKBN programs, socialization & integration of local curricula
Community	Mass Organizations, NGOs, Communities, Local Leaders	Facilitating values of national defense, partner in raising awareness among citizens at the grassroots level

Regulatory Review per Document

The regulatory framework for fostering national defense awareness shows a gradual institutional role but is still state-oriented. Law No. 23 of 2019 has divided authority between the central and regional governments, but has not explicitly included non-state actors as substantive implementers. Strengthening began to be seen in Government Regulation Number 3 of 2021, which clarified the responsibilities for implementing PKBN in the fields of education, society, and the world of work, although the mapping of actors was still dominated by government agencies. Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 8 of 2022 is the most detailed regulation, assigning tasks to ministries/agencies, providing room for adaptation for local governments based on local wisdom, and opening opportunities for civil society organizations to participate in the dissemination of national defense values, but without a partnership design, incentives, and operational collaboration mechanisms. Meanwhile, Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022 established a multi-agency National Patriotic Defense Coordination Forum, but its centralized leadership structure within the Ministry of Defense and top-down approach limit the space for substantive civil society participation. Critically, this implementation architecture still places civil society—including local communities, religious organizations, academics, and the media—as complementary actors rather than strategic partners, and makes inter-agency coordination administrative rather than collaborative, due to the absence of cross-sectoral joint management mechanisms that enable functional and dynamic synergies in the implementation of PKBN..

Stakeholder Engagement Scheme

There is a multi-actor engagement mechanism in the implementation of PKBN, but the dominance of state actors is still very strong, and the involvement of non-state actors has not been regulated in a systemic and sustainable manner. The involvement of cross-sectoral actors in State Defense Awareness Development (PKBN) is explicitly regulated in several policy documents:

Table 4. PKBN provisions in policy documents

Documents	Forms of Involvement
Law No. 23 of 2019	The central and regional governments are responsible for implementing PKBN. Community participation is mentioned, but the mechanism is not specified.
Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021	Assign ministries/institutions to implement PKBN in accordance with their respective fields of duty; open up opportunities for involvement from the education sector and the business world.
Minister of Defense Regulation No. 8 of 2022	Detailing the stages of PKBN implementation involving ministries/agencies, local governments, community organizations, and the business world. The involvement of non-state actors is mentioned in the context of facilitating and implementing activities.
Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022	Forming a State Defense Coordination Forum consisting of representatives from ministries/agencies, with opportunities for civil society involvement through programs at the education and work levels.

Table 5. Actors and their involvement in PKBN

Actor Categories	Forms of Involvement	Regulated in
Ministries/Institutions (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Manpower, Ministry of Home Affairs, PAN-RB, etc.)	Preparation of PKBN materials, training, implementation of programs in accordance with sectoral duties and functions	Ministry of Defense Regulation 8/2022, Presidential Regulation 115/2022

Indonesian National Armed Forces/Indonesian National Police	Training resource persons, PKBN activity facilitators, involvement in basic training	Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 8/2022
Local Government (Province/Regency/City)	Technical implementation of programs, development of local defense curriculum, facilitation of activities	Government Regulation No. 3/2021, Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 8/2022
Educational Institutions (schools, universities)	Integration of defense values into the curriculum and extracurricular activities	Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 8/2022, RANBN
Community Organizations (NU, Muhammadiyah, Karang Taruna, Scouts, etc.)	Socialization, community-based training, fostering defense values in the community	Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 8/2022
Business and Industry (DUDI)	Soft skills-based defense training, involvement in CSR programs based on national values	Government Regulation No. 3/2021, RANBN
Media and Broadcasting Institutions	Means of disseminating defense messages, public campaigns	Presidential Regulation No. 115/2022 (implicit)

Evaluation of Engagement Mechanisms

The multi-actor engagement policy framework in the State Defense Awareness Program (PKBN) has demonstrated its superiority through formal recognition of the role of non-state actors, such as community organizations, the business world, and educational institutions, as well as the mandate to establish Coordination Forums at the national and regional levels as stipulated in Presidential Regulation 115/2022. However, its implementation still faces a number of limitations, particularly the absence of binding collaborative schemes, such as joint funding mechanisms, cross-sector program integration, and formal cooperation contracts, so that the role of civil society tends to be limited to implementing activities rather than designing or evaluating policies. In addition, there are no performance indicators or specific incentives for non-government stakeholders, which could potentially reduce the effectiveness and sustainability of their participation. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen multi-actor engagement schemes through the establishment of formal institutional partnerships between the Ministry of Defense and local communities, the formation of a Joint Task Force for PKBN at the regional level that structurally involves local governments, mass organizations, and the private sector, the development of an incentive system for businesses and educational institutions that integrate the value of national defense, and the use of media and digital influencers as part of a soft power-based communication strategy.

Continuity & Evaluation

Some regulations have included evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, but they are still normative in nature, not yet measurable, and not yet equipped with a sustainable data-based follow-up system.

Table 6. Level of depth of PKBN policy documents

Regulations	Evaluation & Sustainability Provisions
Law No. 23 of 2019	Does not explicitly regulate the PKBN program evaluation mechanism.

Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021	Mentions periodic reporting by implementers to relevant ministries, but does not specify evaluation methods.
Minister of Defense Regulation No. 8 of 2022	Mentions the evaluation stage as part of the PKBN activity cycle, but it is administrative and procedural in nature.
Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022	It is the only regulation that explicitly mandates annual evaluation and monitoring of PKBN implementation, both by ministries/agencies and local governments.

Forms of Evaluation and Monitoring

The National Coordination Forum for State Defense (FKBN) is positioned as a key actor mandated to monitor, collect data, and evaluate the implementation of the National Action Plan for State Defense (RANBN), with the aim of assessing the achievement of PKBN performance targets, identifying various implementation obstacles, and providing feedback that forms the basis for planning improvements in the next period. However, the implementation of these evaluative functions has not been supported by the formulation of measurable key performance indicators, the application of systematic quantitative analysis methods, or adequate integration with result databases such as the State Defense Index (IBN), so that the effectiveness of the evaluation mechanism and its leverage on improving policy quality remains limited.

Problems in Evaluation Implementation

The implementation of PKBN evaluation and monitoring in the field still faces a number of fundamental problems, mainly because the evaluation process tends to be sectoral and formalistic, positioned as a bureaucratic reporting obligation rather than as an instrument for learning and policy improvement. The absence of national evaluation standards has led to each agency and region using different formats and indicators, while evaluation results are not systematically linked to decision-making or policy adjustments. This weakness is exacerbated by limited follow-up and continuity mechanisms, given that the five-year National Defense Action Plan (RANBN) does not include operational explanations on the use of annual evaluation results for plan adjustments. The absence of publication of evaluation results that would ensure transparency and space for academic criticism, and the absence of a reward and sanction scheme for agencies or regions based on their performance in implementing PKBN. To strengthen the evaluation system and ensure policy sustainability, it is necessary to integrate PKBN evaluation with National Defense Index (IBN) data on a periodic basis to encourage evidence-based evaluation, the establishment of qualitative and quantitative performance indicators oriented towards substantive results, the development of a publicly accessible national PKBN dashboard as a means of transparency and accountability, and the establishment of an obligation for local governments to prepare PKBN Annual Action Plans as a concrete follow-up to the results of national monitoring.

The following is a comparison table of PKBN regulations in terms of evaluation and sustainability, highlighting the extent to which each regulation regulates evaluation mechanisms, the types of evaluation involved, the instruments used, and the follow-up actions. This table reinforces the argument that Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022 is the only regulation that explicitly stipulates multi-stakeholder-based annual evaluations.

Table 7. Comparison of PKBN Regulations in Evaluation

Regulations	Evaluation exists	Types of Evaluation	Evaluation Instruments
Law No. 23/2019	Not explicit	-	-
Government Regulation No. 3/2021	Exists (general)	Administrative reporting	Report to the Minister of Defense

Minister of Defense Regulation No. 8/2022	Exists (activity stages)	Evaluation of PKBN activities	Documentation & implementation reports
Presidential Regulation No. 115/2022	Exists (explicit & annual)	Evaluation of RANBN & implementers	Coordination Forum, Multi-Ministry Reporting

Strategic Recommendations

a. Redesign a More Participatory and Network-Based Institutional Structure (Network-Based Governance)

The current structure of national defense is still dominated by a linear and hierarchical bureaucracy, which makes decision-making and program execution processes tend to be rigid and unresponsive to social dynamics. Therefore, it is necessary to overhaul the institutional paradigm towards a collaborative, flexible, and adaptive network governance model. In this new structure, the government is no longer the sole center of control but acts as a facilitator connecting various actors such as mass organizations, local communities, the media, academics, and the private sector. A concrete form of this redesign could be the delegation of some policy functions to local units and community partners that have strong social capacity and legitimacy.

b. Giving a Significant Role to Civil Society as a Key Actor, not Just a Technical Implementer

Until now, the involvement of civil society in national defense has remained symbolic, as training participants, socialization implementers, or administrative partners. In fact, in the framework of soft power, civil society is the main producer of national values that originate from cultural roots, local identities, and community wisdom. The recommendation is to encourage the repositioning of civil society as a key actor, namely by providing space for them to design, implement, and evaluate PKBN programs. This includes the development of community-based training modules, digital social campaigns, and informal education on nationality. This approach will not only expand the reach of the program, but also deepen its social legitimacy.

c. Establishment of Regional Coordination Forums with the Involvement of Mass Organizations, Universities, and the Media

In order for the values of national defense to spread in a relevant and contextual manner, a coordination mechanism that operates at the regional level is needed. Currently, many coordination forums are national and technocratic in nature, even though the actual challenges of national defense are often local in nature (such as intolerance, disinformation, or identity conflicts). Therefore, a Regional PKBN Coordination Forum is needed that officially involves religious organizations, higher education institutions, local media, digital communities, and other informal sectors. This forum must have the authority to develop action plans, access resources, and evaluate program results within their respective regions. In this way, PKBN will transform from a central program into a local movement that is deeply rooted and sustainable.

d. Partnership and Incentive Schemes for Non-State Actors who Independently Implement National Values Programs

One of the main weaknesses in the current national defense policy is the lack of structured incentives for non-state actors who are actively building national awareness. In fact, many institutions and communities have implemented similar programs with innovative approaches and wide reach, for example through digital media, literacy communities, arts and culture, or informal education. Therefore, the state needs to establish strategic partnership schemes with these actors through the following mechanisms: Thematic national defense grants, Outcome-based financing schemes, Formal recognition in the form of accreditation or national awards, Integration of their activities into the national PKBN reporting system.

Policy Domain Categorization

To clarify the content dimensions, each document is classified into three policy domains (adapted from Dunn, 2003 and Bridgman & Davis, 2012):

Table 8. Three policy domains (adapted from Dunn, 2003 and Bridgman & Davis, 2012)

Domain	Characteristics	Examples in Documents
Normative	Objectives, values, and basic principles of national defense	Law No. 3/2002: definition of national defense and citizens' rights
Instrumental	Tools, organizational structure, and funding	Ministerial Regulation No. 9/2022: mechanisms for regeneration and facilitators
Implementative	Procedures for policy implementation	Government Regulation No. 3/2021 and Ministerial Regulation No. 8/2022: forms of training, evaluation, and distribution of roles

Table 9. Content Analysis Matrix of State Defense Policy Documents

Policy Documents	Normative Domain	Instrumental Domain	Implementative Domain
Law No. 3 of 2002 on National Defense	Legal basis of national defense as a right and obligation of citizens	Establishment of a universal defense system	General, non-operational
Law No. 23 of 2019 on PSDN for National Defense	Integration of national defense in SDN management	Institutional framework, functions of Reserve and Support Components	Division of roles between central and regional governments
Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021 (Implementation of Law 23/2019)	Elaboration of legal norms	Development mechanisms, institutional structure	Initial technical instructions for the implementation of Komcad & Komduk
Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022 concerning PKBN Policy	Establishment of Master Plan & RANBN as a national framework	Establishment of coordination forums, inter-ministerial structures	Implementation, supervision, evaluation, and funding of the national defense program
Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 8 of 2022 concerning PKBN	Definition and basic principles of PKBN	Program forms, stages of development activities	Guidelines for implementing national defense awareness training in various spheres
Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 9 of 2022 concerning BN Cadres and Facilitators	The value of national defense as the basis for cadre development	Structure of trainers, facilitators, and competency standards	Training management, recruitment, assessment

Discussion

Content analysis of key national defense policy documents—ranging from the PKBN Master Plan, RANBN, to various Ministerial Regulations and Presidential Regulations—shows strong consistency in the basic values of national defense, such as love for the homeland, national and state awareness, willingness to sacrifice, and discipline, which are normatively integrated into the overall policy framework, from the Common Thematic Agenda (CTA), State Defense Framework of Reference (KBB), Integrative Implementation Strategy (SPI), to the Evidence-Based Plan (RBB) and State Defense Action Framework (KAB), thus reflecting a unified direction in national character building through PKBN. However, at the institutional and governance levels, there are still significant weaknesses, particularly in the accountability mechanisms and effectiveness of cross-sector coordination as regulated in Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2022, which tends to be administrative in nature because it is not yet equipped with a performance reporting system, outcome measurement, and a reward and punishment scheme at the regional level. On the other hand, although Minister of Defense Regulations No. 8 and 9 of 2022 indicate a shift towards a soft power approach and public participation through community involvement and state defense facilitators, their implementation is still predominantly top-down and does not provide adequate space for co-creation for non-state actors as strategic partners. The most fundamental weakness lies

in the absence of an integrated data-based evaluation system that forms a continuous feedback loop, so that PKBN monitoring is still oriented towards formal reporting rather than outcomes, which ultimately requires institutional and policy management reforms so that the transformation towards a civil and participatory approach can truly build sustainable national soft power.

The results of content analysis of the regulatory framework, program design, and dynamics of the 2022–2024 State Defense Index (IBN) show that policy effectiveness is determined by its ability to close the cycle from formulation to real impact, with the IBN serving as a compass for results to prove the program's contribution to changes in national attitudes and behavior. This analysis produced three sequential outputs—a diagnosis of implementation problems, the development of tiered performance indicators, and alternative policy recommendations—that maintain the connection between input–process–output–outcome, while revealing gaps in derivative policies, the capacity and financing of implementers, cross-actor coordination that is still administrative, and measures of success that do not yet link activities to changes in the IBN. Based on this diagnosis, a package of auditable evaluation indicators was formulated by combining leading indicators as a rapid correction tool and IBN-based lagging indicators as annual benchmarks, accompanied by minimum methodological standards such as pre-post measurement, consistency of analysis units, and integration of process–outcome data. Policy recommendations are directed at strengthening network governance through regional implementation forums with decision-making authority and periodic data-based reviews, program design differentiation between national core material and contextual local modules, and fiscal sustainability through results-based funding, matching funds, and performance incentives, reinforced by train-the-trainer, modular materials, media/platform partnerships, and a two-layer IBN dashboard with policy correction thresholds. With ethical data governance and inclusive national communication within the penta-helix framework, national defense policies are directed to shift from an activity-oriented approach to proven results, in order to strengthen cross-actor accountability and long-term national resilience.

The operational strategy of the State Defense Resilience Program (PKBN) places the internalization of national values as a structured and continuous educational process through curriculum integration in formal and non-formal channels, with core national material adapted to local socio-cultural contexts and an experience-based pedagogical approach so that reasoning, attitudes, and skills are developed coherently. The strengthening of values is also carried out through a layered public communication strategy that combines national narratives with local messages through face-to-face and digital channels, with success measured not only by reach but also by measurable behavioral change. Implementation is reinforced by the education and training of cadres and facilitators as stipulated in Permenhan No. 9/2022, through a tiered train-the-trainer scheme based on competency standards, incentives, and formal recognition to maintain quality and sustainability. All interventions are controlled by a monitoring and evaluation system that integrates process (leading) and outcome (lagging) indicators based on the State Defense Index (IBN) with pre-post measurements and panel tracking, presented in a tiered dashboard to enable periodic evidence-based policy corrections. This strategy is supported by a penta-helix governance that affirms the role of local government, defense elements, educational institutions and communities, the media, and the business world, with cadres and facilitators as the connecting nodes of policy and practice, so that PKBN functions as a relevant, measurable, and accountable intervention system in strengthening national resilience.

Based on the 2024 IBN Report, the national State Defense Index score reached 3.50, which is categorized as quite high, indicating a relatively solid internalization of state defense values in aggregate, although it still hides significant variations between dimensions and regions. The dimension with the highest achievement is Willingness to Sacrifice for the Nation and State (RBB), which reflects a strong collective orientation and social solidarity, while Love for the Homeland

(CTA) and Initial National Defense Capability (KAB) show weaknesses in a number of regions, particularly Papua and Southeast Sulawesi, which are influenced by geographical, socio-cultural, demographic, and economic factors, as well as the limited relevance and reach of programs. These findings confirm that national defense awareness is dynamic, deformable, and reversible, influenced by information flows, socio-political events, program implementation quality, and facilitator capacity, so that evaluation needs to be longitudinal rather than merely activity-based. Policy implications emphasize the need to strengthen CTA through localized and participatory national narratives, strengthen KAB through an experiential learning-based basic skills curriculum, and accelerate facilitator capacity building through train-the-trainer, micro-credentials, and coaching. The proposed improvement targets include an increase in the national IBN of $\geq +0.10$ within 12–24 months, an increase in CTA and KAB of $\geq +0.15$ in $\geq 60\%$ of target districts/cities, and a reduction in interregional inequality of $\geq 10\%$, with supporting indicators such as modular curriculum coverage $\geq 70\%$, facilitator:participant ratio $\leq 1:30$, data upload compliance $\geq 90\%$, and effect size measurement. The evaluation is conducted through a pre-post design and institutional panel, integration of process and outcome data using quantitative and qualitative triangulation approaches, and supported by a two-layer dashboard with a policy feedback loop, where $\Delta \text{IBN} < +0.05$ within 12 months or a decline in CTA/KAB for two consecutive quarters triggers intervention redesign, with initial priority focused on Papua and Southeast Sulawesi through integrated intervention packages monitored quarterly–annually.

The national IBN score of 3.50 in 2024 indicates relatively stable aggregate awareness; however, dimensional disparities reveal uneven policy impact. The strong performance in the Willingness to Sacrifice (RBB) dimension reflects successful normative value internalization, whereas weaker outcomes in Love for the Homeland (CTA) and Initial Defense Capability (KAB), particularly in Papua and Southeast Sulawesi, suggest that symbolic identification does not automatically translate into contextual engagement or practical readiness. This gap highlights limited alignment between program activities and measurable outcome indicators. From a policy cycle perspective, the findings indicate that evaluation mechanisms remain administratively oriented and insufficiently integrated with performance benchmarks. This pattern confirms the theoretical argument of soft power (Nye) that value internalization must be supported by persuasive and participatory governance mechanisms, and it reinforces the policy cycle perspective that evaluation feedback is essential to transform symbolic compliance into measurable behavioral outcomes.

The success of the State Defense Resilience Program (PKBN) is largely determined by the synergy between institutions orchestrated within the framework of evidence-based network governance, from policy formulation to measurable impact. The Ministry of Defense, together with relevant ministries and agencies (BRIN, Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Home Affairs), supported by the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)/Indonesian National Police (Polri), local governments, and communities, form a collaborative ecosystem with clear role sharing, regular coordination forums, and outcome-based accountability through the National Defense Index (IBN). The evidence base is strengthened through the development of data science-based analytical methodologies (PCA, SEM-PLS, DNN), standardized data pipelines, and two-layer dashboards that support the policy feedback loop cycle. The operational synergy model mainstreams national defense in the RPJMN and K/L Strategic Plans, integrates the ASN education and training curriculum in a modular and contextual manner, and provides transparent and adaptive region-based monitoring. The 2024–2045 roadmap is structured in phases: Phase I (2024–2026) builds the foundation of data-AI, facilitator capacity, and dashboards with an initial target of $\Delta \text{IBN} \geq +0.05$;

Phase II (2026–2030) mainstreams the curriculum, regional training centers, and results-based funding with a cumulative target of Δ IBN $\geq +0.10$ and a reduction in disparities of $\geq 10\%$; and Phase III (2030–2045) will consolidate the digital community ecosystem and local culture, as well as AI-based automatic national evaluation, with a cumulative target of Δ IBN $\geq +0.25$ and a reduction in inequality of $\geq 25\%$, thereby transforming national defense into a sustainable, accountable, and adaptive social practice.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that while PKBN possesses a mature normative and legal foundation, its effectiveness depends on the quality of cross-sectoral governance and measurable evaluation systems. Empirical analysis of 2022–2024 IBN data confirms relatively stable national awareness, with the 2024 score reaching 3.50, but reveals persistent regional and dimensional disparities indicating uneven policy impact. Regulatory coherence exists; however, soft power integration and network-based governance remain partial and administratively oriented. By positioning IBN as an operational policy compass linking inputs, processes, and outcomes, this study bridges the gap between regulatory design and empirical results. Strengthening structured performance indicators, integrating IBN into continuous feedback loops, and differentiating regional interventions are essential to transform PKBN into an outcome-oriented and adaptive non-military defense policy instrument.

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